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KEY POINTS
 Human monkeypox is a zoonosis caused by the monkeypox virus (MPXV), a double-
stranded DNA virus of the family Poxviridae.
 The frequency and geographic distribution of human monkeypox cases across West and
Central Africa have increased in recent years.
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Continued
 The clinical presentation of monkeypox is similar to that of smallpox, in terms of symptom
onset, timing of rash occurrence, and rash distribution, but generally less severe than
smallpox with lower fatality rate and scarification.
 Most confirmed Monkeypox cases are younger than 40 years with a median age of
31 years, a population born only after discontinuation of the smallpox vaccination
campaign, and thus may reflect a lack of cross-protective immunity.
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Human monkeypox virus (MPXV) is a double-stranded DNA virus of the Orthopoxvirus
genus of the family Poxviridae.1–4 Two genetic clades of the monkeypox virus have
been characterized: West African and Central African. MPXV is one of the 4 orthopox-
virus species pathogenic for humans, the other 3 being (1) variola major virus (VARV),
the causative agent of smallpox, now eradicated, (2) variola minor virus, and (3) cow-
pox virus (CPXV). There is a range of animal poxviruses, several of which have zoo-
notic potential. Infections in humans have been described for vaccinia virus,
cowpox virus, buffalopox virus, and sporadic cases of camelpox.5,6 Monkeypox in-
fects a wide range of mammalian species, but its natural host reservoir remains
unknown.
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE
Thought to be a rare and self-limiting disease,7 monkeypox has not attracted much
attention since its discovery 70 years ago. The frequency and geographic distribution
of human monkeypox cases have increased in recent years in a specific region of Af-
rica (Fig. 1),8 and monkeypox has been recognized as an increasing public health
threat, particularly in regions in West Africa where there is close interaction between
humans and wild animal reservoirs and in particular where there is evidence that the
infection attack rate is increasing. The clinical presentation of monkeypox is similar
to that of smallpox2 in terms of symptom onset, timing of rash occurrence, and rash
distribution,7 but generally less severe than smallpox in terms of complication rate,
case fatality rate, and levels of scarification.
Recently, concern has been raised about the emergence of MPXV as well as the
resemblance of its clinical presentation to that of smallpox, a deadly disease globally
eradicated by vaccination 40 years ago.9 During outbreaks, it has been challenging to
clinically distinguish monkeypox from chickenpox, an unrelated herpesvirus infection.
However, sporadic zoonotic infections with other orthopoxviruses also call for vigi-
lance. Outbreaks of buffalopox have occurred with multiple human cases in India.10
Similarly, during outbreaks of vaccinia virus infection in cattle in Brazil, there is docu-
mented evidence of human infections.11
Cross-Immunity and Protection
Various orthopoxvirus species share genetic and antigenic features,12–14 and an infec-
tion by any of these species may confer substantial protection against infection by the
others.15 Vaccination with vaccinia virus protects against disease caused by VARV,
MPXV, or CPXV.16 The immunologic mechanisms underlying cross-protection by im-
munization with vaccinia virus seem to be diverse, with neutralizing antibodies among
the principal components.17 Consistent with the ability of smallpox vaccine to provide
Fig. 1. Map of Africa showing countries reporting human Monkeypox cases (1971–2019).
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monkeypox by immunization with the human smallpox vaccine.18,19
Ever since smallpox vaccinations were discontinued in 1978, cross-protective im-
munity to various orthopoxviruses has waned, particularly in younger individuals lack-
ing vaccinia-induced immunity, and the number of unvaccinated, susceptible
individuals has grown worldwide. Indeed, these changes have been accompanied
by an increased frequency and geographic distribution of human monkeypox cases
in recent years.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
Discovery and Animal Reservoirs
MPXV was first detected in 1958 in an outbreak of a vesicular disease among
captive monkeys transported to Copenhagen, Denmark from Africa for research
purposes. Hence the name “monkeypox.”20 The term is inappropriate because
the largest animal reservoirs of the virus have been found in rodents, including
squirrels and giant pouched rats, both of which are hunted for food.21 Rodents
are the largest group of mammals with more than 1500 species. The extent of
the wild animal reservoir, the natural history, and pathogenesis of monkeypox in
Petersen et al4both animals and humans remains unknown, requiring characterization through
ecologic and epidemiologic studies. Thus far, MPXV has been detected in diverse
animal species: squirrels (rope and tree), rats, striped mice, dormice, and monkeys.
In 1985, the virus was isolated from a rope squirrel in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and a dead infant mangabey monkey in Tai National Park, Cote
d’Ivoire.22 During a large monkeypox outbreak following introduction of the virus
through animals imported into an animal trading company, at least 14 species of
rodents were found to be infected.23
Like humans, monkeys are considered disease hosts. Further studies are needed
to understand how the virus persists in nature, and to explore pathogen-host asso-
ciations and the effect of climatic and ecologic factors influencing the shifts be-
tween geographic areas and the virus as a cause of disease in humans.24
Transmission of Monkeypox Virus to Humans
Not only the specific animal host reservoir of monkeypox but also the mode of trans-
mission of MPXV from animals to humans remain unknown. Aerosol transmission has
been demonstrated in animals,25,26 and may explain a nosocomial outbreak in the
Central African Republic.27 However, indirect or direct contact with live or dead ani-
mals is assumed to be the driver of human monkeypox infections in humans.28,29
Poverty and continued civil unrest force people to hunt small mammals (bushmeat)
to obtain protein-rich food, thus increasing exposure to wild rodents, which may carry
monkeypox.30
In August 1970 the first human case of monkeypox was identified in a 9-year-old
child with smallpox-like vesicular skin lesions in the village of Bukenda in the Equato-
rial region of Zaire (now DRC).31 This patient was found during a period of intensified
smallpox surveillance conducted 9 months after the World Health Organization (WHO)
the eradication of smallpox in the DRC had certified the eradication of smallpox in the
DRC.
Geographic Endemicity and Increase in Number of Cases
Ever since its discovery, the disease has been endemic to Central andWest Africa with
intermittent, sporadic cases of monkeypox transmitted from local wildlife reported
among humans. Retrospective studies indicated that similar cases had occurred in
1970 to 1971 in the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.32–35 Subsequent
enhanced surveillance observed a steady increase in the rate of human monkeypox
cases. The number of cases of human monkeypox has increased exponentially over
the past 20 years, and has already exceeded that accumulated during the first 45 years
since its first discovery.28,29,36–45
A comprehensive enhanced surveillance study in the DRC in 2004 to 2005
showed a steep increase in incidence compared with data from a WHO enhanced
surveillance program carried out from 1970 to 1986 reporting 404 cases.46 The
incidence was highest in forested regions, and in lower age groups not vaccinated
as part of the smallpox eradication program.42 To date, human monkeypox cases
have been reported from 10 African countries: DRC, Republic of the Congo,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Gabon, and South Sudan.1,36,47 The growing incidence of human monkeypox
cases in Central and West Africa is considered a consequence of waning cross-
protective immunity among the population after smallpox vaccination was
discontinued in the early 1980s, following the eradication of smallpox.28,42 The
deteriorating immunologic status is not only related to waning vaccine-induced
protection among those initially vaccinated, but probably—and even more—to
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younger age groups. Both mechanisms lead to a growing percentage of suscepti-
ble individuals in the endemic areas in Central and West Africa. Another central
factor considered to contribute to the incidence of monkeypox is related to
increasing contact between humans and small mammals potentially carrying
MPXV. Humans invade jungles and forests, the natural environment of the reservoir
species. Civil wars, refugee displacement, farming, deforestation, climate change,
demographic changes, and population movement may have led to a spread of
monkeypox-infected animals and increased their interaction with humans across
West and Central Africa.
Monkeypox Cases in the United States
Monkeypox remained an ignored global public health threat and was only given inter-
national attention when the first cases outside Africa were detected in the United
States in 2003.48 After several Midwesterners developed fever, rash, respiratory
symptoms, and lymphadenopathy, outbreak investigation linked the symptoms to
exposure to pet prairie dogs (Cynomys species), and monkeypox virus was identified
as a causative agent.48 It spread rapidly. Monkeypox cases were reported from
6 states—Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin—during the
outbreak.49 Molecular investigations identified a monkeypox virus of the West African
genetic group (clade). Epidemiologic studies concluded that the virus had been im-
ported into the United States, more specifically to Texas, from Ghana on April 9,
2003, with a shipment of small mammals of 9 different species, including 6 genera
of African rodents.50 These comprised rope squirrels (Funiscuirus sp.), tree squirrels
(Heliosciurus sp.), African giant pouched rats (Cricetomys sp.), brush-tailed porcu-
pines (Atherurus sp.), dormice (Graphiurus sp.), and striped mice (Lemniscomys
sp.). Some of the infected animals were housed in close proximity to prairie dogs later
sold as pets.
Monkeypox Cases in the United Kingdom and Israel
In September 2018, monkeypox again drew the attention of global media, politi-
cians, and scientists when 3 individual patients in the United Kingdom were diag-
nosed with monkeypox.51 The first 2 had recently traveled in Nigeria, a country
with an ongoing outbreak of the disease,52 and both were symptomatic during their
flight home. The third case of monkeypox in the United Kingdom was diagnosed in
a health care worker caring for 1 of these first 2 patients. As the clinical picture of
the 3 patients’ disease raised a concern over an exotic disease, special infection
control measures were taken well before monkeypox was suspected. One of the
primary cases reported contact with a person with suspected rash at a family gath-
ering, and the consumption of bushmeat.52 Secondary and tertiary human-to-
human transmission of monkeypox does occur in endemic areas.53,54 Of note,
definitive confirmation of human-to-human transmission in endemic areas is some-
what problematic, because even the secondary and tertiary cases may have been
exposed to infected animals. The disease contracted by the British health care
worker provides indisputable evidence of human-to-human transmission from an
infected patient.
In October 2018, Israel reported a monkeypox case imported from Nigeria.55 It is
well known that travelers can act as sentinels of infectious disease epidemics in the
region visited. Not consistent with the reports of low levels of transmission in Nigeria,
3 cases imported to other countries from there within a couple of months should raise
the concern of health authorities.56
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On September 22, 2017, the Nigeria Center for Disease Control (NCDC) commenced
an outbreak investigation following the identification of a suspected case of monkey-
pox in an 11-year-old child.57 The data available indicate that the current outbreak is
either a multisource outbreak or one stemming from previously undetected endemic
transmission, because the cases were not epidemiologically linked.28,58–60 The exact
zoonotic origin and role of environmental and ecologic factors in the Nigerian outbreak
are not yet known. New cases of monkeypox continue to be detected in the country.
Since the beginning of the outbreak on September 22, 2018, as of January 1, 2019
there have been 311 suspected cases reported from 26 states (132 confirmed cases
affecting children and adults of all ages) and 7 deaths reported.60 Most of the
confirmed monkeypox patients are aged between 21 and 40 years, with a median
age of 31 years, similar to the observed age range in DRC.42 It is noteworthy that all
were born after 1978, when the global vaccination programs for smallpox were
discontinued.MODES OF TRANSMISSION OF MONKEYPOX VIRUS TO HUMANS
The exact mode of MPXV transmission to humans remains unknown. Primary animal-
to-human infection is assumed to occur when handling monkeypox-infected animals,
through direct (touch, bite, or scratch) or indirect contact, although the exact mecha-
nism(s) remains to be defined. The virus is assumed to enter the body through broken
skin, respiratory tract, or the mucous membranes (eyes, nose, or mouth). Secondary
human-to-human transmission is considered common,37,53,61 presumably through
large respiratory droplets or direct or indirect contact with body fluids, lesion material,
and contaminated surfaces or other material, such as clothing or linens. Prolonged
contact with patients renders hospital staff and family members at greater risk of infec-
tion. Nosocomial transmission has been described.38 There is no evidence to date that
human-to-human transmission alone can sustain monkeypox infections in the human
population.
There have only been a few genomic studies of the origins of monkeypox outbreaks.
Human-to-human transmission has been described from primary human cases and
secondary cases,53,62,63 and serial transmission across 4 cases has been observed.64
In the current monkeypox outbreak in Nigeria, genomic studies of monkeypox virus
isolates from humans60 indicate that the index case was not imported into Nigeria.
Thus, the outbreak is considered to be a spillover frommultiple sources of introduction
into the human population. The zoonotic source(s) of the outbreak are being investi-
gated at present, and it is unclear what, if any, environmental or ecologic changes
might have facilitated the sudden re-emergence of monkeypox in Nigeria. Case clus-
tering has been identified within the various states, but no epidemiologic linkages be-
tween them have been detected thus far. Three family clusters have been identified,
suggesting human-to-human transmission.58–60 In one family the secondary attack
rate was 71%. However, most patients had no obvious epidemiologic linkage or
person-to-person contact, indicating a probable multiple-source outbreak or,
possibly, an endemic disease previously unrecognized.CLINICAL FEATURES
The incubation period has been estimated at 5 to 21 days, and duration of symptoms
and signs at 2 to 5 weeks. The illness begins with nonspecific symptoms and signs
that include fever, chills, headaches, lethargy, asthenia, lymph node swellings, back
Human Monkeypox 7pain, and myalgia (muscle ache) and begins with a fever before rashes appear. Within
1 to 5 days after the onset of fever, rashes of varying sizes appear, first on the face
(Fig. 2), then across the body (Fig. 3), hands (Fig. 4A), and legs and feet (Fig. 4B).
The rash undergoes several stages of evolution from macules, papules, vesicles
(fluid-filled blisters) (see Fig. 2), and pustules (see Fig. 3B, D), followed by resolution
over time with crusts and scabs (Fig. 5), which drop off on recovery. Various stages
of the rash may show at the same time (see Figs. 3B and 5). Areas of erythema
(see Fig. 2A) and/or skin hyperpigmentation (see Fig. 5) are often seen around discrete
lesions. Detached scabs may be considerably smaller than the original lesion. Inflam-
mation of the pharyngeal, conjunctival, and genital mucosae may also be seen.
The clinical presentation of monkeypox includes symptoms and lesions that are
difficult to distinguish from smallpox.37,60,65,66 Although the clinical manifestations of
monkeypox are milder than smallpox, the disease can prove fatal, death rates ranging
from 1% to 10%. Mortality is higher among children and young adults and the course
is more severe in immunocompromised individuals.67 A range of complications has
been reported, such as secondary bacterial infections, respiratory distress, broncho-
pneumonia, encephalitis, corneal infection with ensuing loss of vision, gastrointestinalFig. 2. (A–D) Maculo-papular-vesicular-pustular monkeypox skin lesions of varying sizes on
the face. (Courtesy of Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.)
Fig. 4. (A, B) Papular-pustular monkeypox skin lesions on the hands, legs, and feet. (Cour-
tesy of Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.)
Fig. 3. (A–D) Papular-vesicular-pustular monkeypox skin lesions of varying sizes across the
body. (Courtesy of Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.)
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Fig. 5. Extensive papulo-pustular monkeypox rashes with crust and scar formation. (Cour-
tesy of Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.)
Human Monkeypox 9involvement, vomiting, and diarrhea with dehydration. Case fatality rates have varied
between 1% and 10% in outbreaks, deaths occurring mostly among young adults and
children. Particularly those with immunosuppression are at risk of severe disease.
Lymphadenopathy is seen in up to 90% of patients and appears to be a clinical feature
distinguishing human monkeypox from smallpox.
Previous smallpox vaccination confers some cross-protection against monkeypox
and modifies the clinical picture toward a milder disease. Between 1980 and 1990,
the clinical presentation of human monkeypox seems to have changed: primary hu-
man cases have increasingly been seen among those never vaccinated against small-
pox. Compared with those vaccinated, the clinical picture described for the
unvaccinated was more severe, with more vigorous and pleomorphic rashes and
higher mortality.62,66,68–70
The primary differential diagnosis is severe chickenpox with lesions in palms and
soles.7,65 The lesions in chickenpox are more superficial and occur in clusters of the
same stage, with denser manifestations on the trunk than on the face and extremities.
Because of the nonspecific nature of the symptoms and signs of monkeypox, a wide
variety of differential diagnoses should be considered, ranging from chickenpox, mol-
luscum contagiosum, measles, rickettsial infections, bacterial skin infections (such as
those caused by Staphylococcus aureus), anthrax, scabies, syphilis, and drug reac-
tions to other noninfectious causes of rash. A clinical sign differentiating monkeypox
from smallpox and chickenpox is the presence of enlarged lymph nodes, particularly
submental, submandibular, cervical, and inguinal nodes.71
SMALLPOX VACCINATION, MONKEYPOX PREVALENCE, AND CHANGING CLINICAL
PRESENTATIONS
In 1980, the Global Commission for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication (GCCSE)
continued to designate monkeypox as a public health threat, recommending that the
epidemiologic, ecologic, and surveillance program on monkeypox be continued.35,72
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pox from 1970 to 1986.46 It was assumed to be endemic to DRC, but other Central and
West African countries also reported cases of monkeypox in humans or circulation in
wildlife. At the end of the smallpox eradication campaign, the GCCSE stated that
smallpox vaccination to prevent monkeypox was no longer justified, even if cross-
protective immunity could not be relied on for long because of the vaccinations being
discontinued. In retrospect, this resolution may have been an error.
Experimental studies of monkeys have shown immunization with smallpox vaccine
to give cross-protection against monkeypox.19
Several reviews have summarized human monkeypox outbreaks over the past
38 years.28,29,42 Between November 2005 and November 2007, population-based
surveillance studies conducted in 9 health zones in central DRC identified 760
laboratory-confirmed human monkeypox cases. The average annual cumulative inci-
dence across the zones was 5.53 per 10,000 (2.18–14.42). Factors associated with
increased risk of infection included living in forested areas, male sex, age less than
15 years, and absence of smallpox vaccination scar. Among those vaccinated, the
risk of monkeypox was found to be 5.2-fold lower than among those unvaccinated
(0.78 versus 4.05 per 10,000). Compared with surveillance data from the same region
recorded in the 1980s, a 20-fold increase in human monkeypox incidence was
observed. Between January 2001 and December 2004, the DRC Ministry of Health
surveillance program reported 2734 cases of suspected human monkeypox in 11
provinces, showing an annual upward trend: 380 cases in 2001, 545 in 2002, 783 in
2003, and 1026 in 2004. Most cases (94%) were observed in children and adults
younger than 25 years.41 These patients had not been vaccinated against smallpox.
Surveillance activities have been halted since 2005 because of the civil war.
DIAGNOSIS: LABORATORY, VIROLOGIC, AND HISTOLOGIC FEATURES
Optimal clinical specimens for laboratory analyses include specimens from skin le-
sions such as swabs of vesicular lesions, exudate, or crusts stored in a dry, sterile
tube (no viral transport media) and kept cold. A viral culture should be obtained by
an oropharyngeal or nasopharyngeal swab. Skin biopsies of vesiculopustular rash
or a sample of the roof of an intact skin vesicular lesion are valuable for analyses.
Reference laboratories with high containment facilities are required to make a defini-
tive diagnosis using electron microscopy, culture and molecular analysis identification
by polymerase chain reaction, and sequencing. Serologic testing requires paired
acute and convalescent sera for MPXV-specific immunoglobulin M detection within
5 days of presentation, or immunoglobulin G detection after 8 days.
Histology and immunohistochemistry of papular lesions may show acanthosis, indi-
vidual keratinocyte necrosis, and basal vacuolization, along with a superficial and
deep perivascular lymphohistiocytic infiltrate in the dermis. Vesicular lesions show
spongiosis with reticular and ballooning degeneration, multinucleated epithelial giant
cells with epidermal necrosis with numerous eosinophils and neutrophils, and features
of vasculitis and viral inclusions in keratinocytes. Intracytoplasmic, round-to-oval in-
clusions with sausage-shaped structures centrally, measuring 200 to 300 mm, may
be seen on electron microscopic observation.
TREATMENT
There is no specific treatment for monkeypox. Supportive care, symptomatic
management, and treatment of secondary bacterial infections remain the main
recommendations.
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Prevention of MPXV spread in endemic areas is highly challenging, and consists of
avoiding any contact with rodents and primates as well as limiting direct exposure
to blood and inadequately cooked meat. Efforts to halt bushmeat trade and con-
sumption of wild animals are extremely difficult both culturally and economically
because this meat may be the only protein source available for the poorest people.
Massive health education campaigns are needed to increase general awareness
and to advise on proper handling of potential animal reservoir species (gloves, pro-
tective clothing, surgical mask) as well as avoiding close contact with anyone
infected.
Infection control measures are vital to prevention of human-to-human transmission
in health care. Improved nursing (gloves, protective clothing, surgical masks) and
isolation practices require education as well as adequate facilities and staffing.
National health authorities should consider arranging immunization against small-
pox for health care workers and those treating or exposed to patients with monkeypox
or their samples. Smallpox vaccination has been estimated to provide 85% cross-
protection against monkeypox infection.32 The Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) recommended smallpox vaccination within 2 weeks, ideally before
4 days, after significant, unprotected exposure to a diseased animal or a confirmed
human case.
During an outbreak, the spread of monkeypox virus may be controlled by quaran-
tining (at least for 6 weeks from the date of last exposure) the infected animals and
tracing their contacts. Adherence to specific instructions from the local and global
public health authorities is mandatory. Increasing awareness and action (adequate de-
cisions, medical staff, sampling, surveillance, education) both by local and interna-
tional authorities are of central importance.
At hospitals in developed countries, when suspecting a case of monkeypox (eg, a
patient with fever, skin lesions, and history of visiting endemic area or contact with pa-
tients), the patient should immediately be placed in a negative air pressure isolation
room, or a private room if such facilities are unavailable. Standard, contact, and
droplet precautions should all be taken. Infection control personnel should be con-
tacted without delay. In developed countries, likewise, increasing awareness among
health care personnel about the disease and its endemic areas is an important
precaution.
VACCINES AGAINST MONKEYPOX
Although new vaccines are being developed for monkeypox, there is a need for con-
ducting controlled clinical trials to evaluate the impact of the use of smallpox vaccines
for prevention of monkeypox or modifying disease severity. Studies should focus on
the cost/benefit of population-level vaccination and investigation of alternative vacci-
nation strategies such as targeting vaccination to affected areas, contacts, and health
care workers, and wider geographic areas. Currently the CDC recommends pre-
exposure smallpox vaccination for field investigators, veterinarians, animal control
personnel, contacts of monkeypox patients, researchers, and health care workers car-
ing for such patients and their contacts.3
Can the Smallpox Vaccine Available Be Used to Protect Against Monkeypox?
Percutaneous inoculation with vaccinia virus elicits a broad and heterogeneous serum
antibody response targeting a large number of antigenic determinants of vaccinia vi-
rus.73,74 The viral inhibitory activity of serum from immune subjects with cross-
Petersen et al12neutralizing activity to vaccinia virus, MPXV, and VARV is presumably composed of
antibodies with diverse specificities.75–77
Production of first-generation live attenuated vaccine has been reviewed by the
WHO in 1988.9 A considerable proportion of the population may have contraindica-
tions for the vaccine candidates: 15.2% to 15.8% of the United States population
has been estimated to have potential contraindications for taking the live attenuated
smallpox vaccine.78
The rates of side effects associated with the live attenuated vaccinia virus in the
United States in 1968 were 74 complications and 1 death per 1 million primary vacci-
nations. Morbidity and mortality rates were highest for infants, with 112 complications
and 5 deaths per million primary vaccinations.79 In 2002, the US Department of De-
fense resumed a program for widespread smallpox vaccinations because of a
perceived threat of biological warfare. A total of 540,824military personnel were vacci-
nated with a New York City Board of Health (NYCBH) strain of vaccinia, “DryVax,” from
December 2002 through December 2003. Dryvax was produced by infecting the skin
of calves using the NYCBH strain as seed virus. Of these, 67 (1 in 8000) developed
myopericarditis.80,81
The highest rate of postvaccine encephalitis (pvE) was found with the Bern strain
(44.9 expected cases per million vaccines), followed by the Copenhagen strain (33.3
per million vaccines), the Lister strain (26.2 per million vaccines), and the NYCBH strain
with the lowest rate (2.9 per million vaccinations).82
ADDRESSING GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE AND STRENGTHENING PUBLIC HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS
Most data available on monkeypox are obtained from individual case or outbreak re-
ports, and from passive intermittent surveillance, none of which convey an accurate
overall picture. The current major gaps in monkeypox knowledge, the changing epide-
miologic and clinical presentations, and the multifarious factors involved in monkey-
pox transmission argue the need to strengthen outbreak preparedness efforts.
There remains an urgent need for developing public health and surveillance capacities
in Central and West Africa to guide appropriate surveillance, data collection, preven-
tion, preparedness, and response activities to monkeypox and other emerging and re-
emerging infections with epidemic potential. Advancing public health preparedness
and aligning proactive surveillance activities to priority research will require coordi-
nated, locally led, multidisciplinary efforts adjusted closely to capacity development
and training.
SUMMARY
The spread of monkeypox across West Africa over the past decade and the ongoing
outbreak in Nigeria indicates that it is no longer “a rare viral zoonotic disease that oc-
curs primarily in remote parts of Central and West Africa, near tropical rainforests.” Its
potential for further spread both regionally and internationally remains a major
concern.28,29 The ecologic, zoonotic, epidemiologic, clinical, and public health as-
pects of monkeypox remain inadequately characterized.33,36,44,45 The first-
generation live attenuated vaccinia virus vaccines stored for emergency purposes in
many countries cannot be used because of severe adverse reactions. Discontinuing
the smallpox vaccination program has created an ecologic gap whereby an increasing
proportion of the population has either waning or nonexistent immunity to MPXV. This
development will further increase the risk of both the animal-to-human and human-to-
human spread of the virus. Therefore, priority research and surveillance should
Human Monkeypox 13urgently be conducted through a joint “One-Human-Animal-Environmental Health”
effort across Central and West Africa.83–85
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